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EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN EQUITY
The doctrine of exemplary damages' has been a subject of much
controversy in this country. 2 It has been settled that they are awarded
only when it is found that the defendant acted with malice, ill will,
or conscious disregard of consequences to others,3 and that they can-
not be recovered in actions based solely upon breach of contract.
4
Whether they may be awarded in a court of equity, however, has not
been so conclusively settled.
The recent Indiana case of Hedworth v. Chapman5 has answered
the question whether a court of equity may grant exemplary damages
in the affirmative. Hedworth filed a complaint in ejectment charging
the Chapmans with wrongful possession of land. The Chapmans filed
a cross-complaint charging Hedworth with misrepresentation concern-
ing the boundaries of the land and the condition of the premises, and
praying for reformation of the real estate contract and for damages,
including exemplary damages. The trial court entered judgment
against Hedworth on his complaint and in favor of the Chapmans on
their cross-complaint; in addition to reforming the real estate contract,
actual and exemplary damages, and costs were granted. On appeal by
Hedworth, the Appellate Court held that the trial court did not
err in awarding exemplary damages and said: "It is our opinion that
a court of equity may grant exemplary damages in a proper case and in
"Exemplary damages, known also as punitive damages and sometimes as "smart
money," has been defined as the "amount allowed over and above actual or coin-
pensatory damages." Dr. P. Phillips & Sons v. Kilgore, 152 Fla. 578, 12 So. 2d 465, 467
(1943). The doctrine originated in the English common-law courts as a means of
justifying excessive awards of damages. E.g., Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 2o5, 95
Eng. Rep. 768 (1763); see generally, 1 Sedgewick, Measure of Damages §§ 348-50
(9th ed. 1912). The primary purpose of exemplary damages today is to punish the
defendant and deter him and others from further offenses. E.g., Motor Equip. Co. v.
McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 133 P.2d 149, 159 (1943).
!For criticisms of the doctrine see, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872); Willis,
Measure of Damages When Property Is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual,
22 Harv L. Rev. 419 (19o9). For defenses of the doctrine see, e.g., Day v. Woodworth,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); I Sedgewick, Measures of Damages § 354 (gth ed. 1912).
Yet, in only four states has the doctrine been definitely rejected altogether. Vincent
v. Morgan's La. & Tex. H.R. and S.S. Co., 14o La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); Burt v.
Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. i, 5 (1891); Boyer v. Varr, 8
Neb. 68 (1878); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
3McCormick, Damages § 79 (1935).
'E.g., Cochran v. Hall, 8 F.2d 984 (5 th Cir. 1925); American Ry. Exp. Co. v.
Bailey, 142 Miss. 622, 107 So. 761 (1926); see generally, McCormick, Damages §
81 (1935)-
6192 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. App. 1963).
CASE COMMENTS
doing so it is merely affording complete relief after it once has ac-
quired jurisdiction."
Although some of the cases which take the view that exemplary
damages may not be recovered in a court of equity are not based on
any particular theory,7 most of them are grounded on one or a com-
bination of the following three theories: (i) a court of equity lacks
the power to award exemplary damages; 8 (2) by seeking equitable re-
lief, a litigant waives all claim to exemplary damages; 9 or (3) the
awarding of exemplary damages is incompatible with the principles
and practice of equityO According to these cases, exemplary damages
should not be awarded in a court of equity even it the facts would
justify an award by a jury at law.11
Following the first theory, some courts have refused to award ex-
emplary damages in equity simply on the basis that a court of equity,
in the absence of an express statutory provision, has no authority to
assess them.12 This is only begging the question, for by merely saying
that a court lacks the power to do something does not explain why it
does.' 3 Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc.14 said the chan-
cellor lacks the authority because "the right to assess a punitive fine
for civil wrongs is best left to the jury."' 5 It would seem, however, that
if this were a serious objection, the court could simply send the issue of
damages to a law court to be tried by a jury as has been done by equity
courts for years.
16
An early authority in the United States for the second theory,
Old. at 651.
7E.g., United States v. Hart, 86 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Va. 1949); Moore v. Carr,
224 Ala. 275, 139 So. 269 (1931); see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 947, 950 (1956).
TE.g., United States v. Bernard, 202 Fed. 728 (9th Cir. 1913); Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co. v. Truly Nolen, Inc., 117 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. i96o); See Annot.,
48 A.L.R.2d 947, 951 (1956).
OE.g., Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 104 A.2d 581 (1954); Bird v.
Wilmington & M.R. Co., 29 S.C. Eq. (8 Rich.) 46 (1855); see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d
947, 954 (1956).
"E.g., Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 546 (1853); Superior Constr.
Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 104 A.2d 581 (1954); see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 947, 953
(1956).
2E.g., Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 20o4 Md. 1, 1o4 A.2d 581 (1954).
'See note 8 supra.
12See I.HI.P. Corp. v. 210 Central Parks So. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 461 228
N.Y.S.2d 883 (Sup. Ct. 1962), in which the court gives another reason for why this
theory is not good, at least as far as jurisdictions where law and equity have been
merged are concerned.
11117 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 196o).
1Id. at 423.
IPSee 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 795 (i 3 th ed. 1886).
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that a litigant by seeking equitable relief waives all claim to exemplary
damages, is Bird v. Wilmington & M.R. Co.17 Although the case has
been cited often as an authority for the theory, it not only fails to
cite any authority for the theory, but also fails to discuss any reasons for
it. In Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo,'5 a suit in equity to enjoin further
trespassing upon realty and for damages, the court adopted this
theory and thought it was especially applicable for two reasons: (1)
the complainants not only failed to ask for punitive damages in the
bill, but also failed to include a prayer for general relief; and (2) the
complainants had a full and adequate alternative to relief in equity,
since a statute' 9 authorized incidental relief by an injunction in an
action at law. In the absence of such additional circumstances, the
waiver theory is another example of circular reasoning, for it in effect
states a result and fails to supply the reason for that result.
20
Perhaps the strongest theory for not allowing exemplary damages
in equity is that the awarding of them is incompatible with the prin-
ciples and practice of equity, namely that a court of equity is a court
of conscience which will not enforce penalties of forfeitures, or go
beyond compensation.21 An early authority that has often been cited
for this third theory is Livingston v. Woodworth.2 2 Actually, however,
the court's indication that it would not have allowed exemplary dam-
ages in this particular case even if they were permissible in equity
makes the case a weak authority for this theory. In the Superior
Construction case23 the court adopted the third theory, as well as the
second one. It admitted that there is the rule that equity will, as in-
cidental relief, award compensatory damages and in so doing sit as a
court of law; but it further said that this rule is a permissive one of
convenience, not a mandatory rule and that it will be followed only
1729 S.C. Eq. (8 Rich.) 46 (1855). It is to be noted that the theory had been
expressed in England previously in Colburn v. Simms, 2 Hare 543, 67 Eng. Rep. 224
(1843). The theory, moreover, has been consistently reaffirmed by the South
Carolina courts. E.g., Standard Warehouse Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 222
S.C. 93, 71 S.E.2d 893 (1952).
192o4 Md. 1, 1o4 A.2d 581 (1954).
'10Md. Ann. Code art. 75, §§ 135-147 (1951). The court in Karns v. Allen, 135
Wis. 48, 115 N.W. 357 (i9 o 8) referred to a similar statute.
2r"[I]t merely begs the question to hold that a waiver has resulted from a mere
asking for equitable relief." I.H.P. Corp. v. 21o Central Park So. Corp., 16 App. Div.
2d 461, .228 N.Y.S.2d 883, 888 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
21See note io supra.
-256 U.S. (15 How.) 546 (1853).
ONote 18 supra at 585.
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as long as it is consistent with the underlying and fundamental prin-
picles of equity. Finally, the third theory was also adopted in Bush v.
Gaffney.2 4 The appellate court, notwithstanding the finding of the jury
for exemplary damages, upheld the refusal of the trial court to award
such damages in decreeing a rescission of a conveyance of land, award-
ing a money judgment, and establishing a constructive trust because
"a court of equity is a court of conscience, but not a forum of ven-
geance." 25 It admitted that its holding was contrary to earlier cases in
the state wherein exemplary damages had been allowed,26 but pointed
out that in none of them was the propriety of a court of equity award-
ing exemplary damages considered.
There are at least two problems with the third theory. The first
problem is suggested by the following statement: "In emphasizing the
punitive aspect of punitive damages it is easy to overlook the punitive
aspect of 'compensatory' damages, particularly since the term 'compen-
satory damages' emphasizes the reparative function.127 Yet, according
to the overwhelming weight of authority, a court of equity may grant
compensatory damages as incidental to equitable relief.28 The second
and even more significant problem arises when one attempts to recon-
cile this theory with the principle of equity that a court of equity hav-
ing taken cognizance of a cause for any purpose, will award relief which
is complete and finally disposes of the litigation.29 Indeed, it is difficult
to reconcile the view that exemplary damages may not be recovered
in equity with this principle.30
The cases that hold that exemplary damages may be recovered
in a court of equity generally fall into two categories: (1) Those that
-'84 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
:Id. at 764. It is to be noted that the court in refusing exemplary damages
relied, in addition, to some extent on the rule that exemplary damages are not
recoverable in an action for breach of contract. See text at note 4 supra.
-'Oliver v. Chapman, 15 Tex. 400 (1855); Western Cottage Piano & Organ Co.
v. Anderson, 97 Tex. 432, 79 S.W. 516 (19o4); Western Cottage Piano & Organ Co.
v. Anderson, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 513, ioi S.W. io6i (1907); and Mossop v. Zapp, 189
S.W. 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
2'Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1188 (1931).
See also, Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 730 (1930);
Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957).
'E.g., Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Chandler, 287 Fed. 848 (2d Cir. 1923).
-E.g., Dennis v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 153 Neb. 865, 46 N.V.2d 6o6 (1951). See
I.H.P. Corp. v. 21o Central Park So. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 461, 228 N.Y.S.2d 883
(Sup. Ct. 1962) in which the Court said in regard to the theory that "Such inflexi-
bility has never been characteristic of equity jurisprudence." Id. at 887.
This is the main reason why the principal case adopted the opposite view.
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rely on the doctrine of the merger of law and equity;3' and (2) those
that award them as a matter of principle.3 2
First, there are two jurisdictions that have relied on the doctrine
of merger. The court in the California case of Union Oil Co. v. Re-
construction Oil Co.3 3 conceded that as a general rule equity does not
award damages by way of punishment, but emphasized that in Cali-
fornia there is but one form of action under the Code. In the New
York case of I.H.P. Corp. v. 21o Central Park So. Corp.3 4 the court
attacked each of the three theories advanced in favor of denying
exemplary damages in equity33 and decided that the rule against the
awarding of punitive damages is based on the historic, but now obso-
lete, procedural separation between law and equity.30
There are other cases which have not relied on the doctrine of
merger. In Tennessee where the courts of law and equity are separate,
the court in Lichter v. Fulcher37 said: "The allowance of punitive
damages in a proper case is a matter largely within the discretion
of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal except in case
of abuse of the discretion." 38 Other Tennessee cases have held that
a court of equity may award punitive damages against a complain-
"E.g., Union Oil Co v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 2o Cal. App. 2d 170, 66 P.2d 1215
(1937). See 55 Mich. L. Rev. 1o59, 1111 (1957) for a list of the states which have
merged systems.
32E.g., Lichter v. Fulcher, 22 Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501 (1938).
32o Cal App. 2d 17o, 66 P.2d 1215 (1937). In regard to this case, the court in the
Superior Construction case pointed out that the damages awarded were actually
enlarged compensatory damages for wilful trespass rather than true punitive
damages. It is submitted, however, that the court was dealing with them as if they
were true punitive damages. Cf. Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal. App. 2d 225, 194 P.ad 533
(1948).
3i6 App. Div.2d 461, 228 N.Y.S.2d 883 (Sup. Ct. 1962). This case expressly over-
rules Dunkel v. McDonald, 272 App. Div. 267, 70 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1947).3-See notes 14, 21, and 29 supra.
"'It is thus apparent that the rule which forbids combination of equitable
relief with an award of punitive damages is founded upon an [obsolete] procedural
division with no rational basis, apart from history, in modern substantive law or
equity. If the facts warrant, it may be entirely appropriate to grant an injunction
or another form of equitable relief and also exact punitive damages as a deterrent
against flagrantly unlawful conduct, whether embraced within an injunction or
not. Such freedom to grant whatever judicial relief the facts call for is entirely
consonant with substantive legal and equitable principles and with present-day
concepts of procedural efficiency." 16 App. Div. 2d 461, 228 N.Y.S.2d 883, 886 (Sup-
Ct. 1962).
w22 Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501 (1938). As pointed out in the Superior
Construction case, it was simply assumed in this case that punitive damages could
be allowed in equity. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, however, later ended any
doubts by expressly ruling that the Chancery Court in Tennessee has authority to
allow punitive damages. Bryson v. Bramlett, 2o4 Tenn. 347, 321 S.W.2d 555 (1958).
122 Tenn. App. 670, 125 S.W.2d 501, 506 (1938).
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ant who maliciously or recklessly invokes the injunctive power of the
court.39
Prior to the principal case, the issue of awarding exemplary dam-
ages in equity was essentially an open question in Indiana. In Waddell
v. Hapner,4 0 a suit in equity to enjoin the continuance of an alleged
nuisance and to recover damages, the court in holding that the com-
plainant was entitled to recover compensatory damages based its de-
cision on the particular facts before it and did not discuss whether
a court of equity can or ever will award punitive damages. The princi-
pal case cites the Lichter case, but in holding that exemplary damages
may be recovered in a court of equity, the court was actually relying
on the principle of complete relief in the equity court: "[E]xemplary
damages may be recovered in a court of equity in our opinion more
fully carries out the theory of broad powers of the equity court."41
This case is particularly significant in view of the fact that as to the
awarding of exemplary damages Indiana has taken a stricter view
than most of the other states, for there, such damages may never
be awarded if the defendant would be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion for the same offense.
42
Finally, as a result of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Texas,43 the issue as to awarding exemplary damages in equity may
no longer be considered unsettled in that state either. The court said:
"There should be a deterrent to conduct which equity con-
demns and for which it will grant relief. The limits beyond
which equity should not go in its exactions are discoverable
in the facts of each case which give rise to equitable relief."
44
It is submitted that there is lacking a substantial reason for the
rule that a court of equity may not grant exemplary damages. The
same is not true in regard to the rule that an equity court may grant
them in the proper case, for this rule more fully carries out the prin-
ciple of complete relief in equity.45 Of course, this does not mean
that they should be allowed in every case in equity, but only when
the facts in a particular case justify an award.46
JAmES L. SURFACE
21E.g., South Penn Oil Co. v. Stone, 57 S.W. 374 (Tenn. Ch. App. igoo).
'0124 Ind. 315, 316, 25 N.E. 368 (189o).
"Note 5 supra at 651.
1'Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1954). See Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of
Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20o Ind. L.J. 123 (1945).
"International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
"Id. at 584.
"See note 29 supra.
"For indications of what would be a proper case, see text at notes 3-4 supra.
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